Ponmocup Hunter is (re-)tired

Update: Video from BotConf talk available now :-) (see below)


For over two and a half years now, since March 2011, I've been researching and analysing this Ponmocup malware, which has so many different names. During this time I've written several blog posts, malware analyses [1, 2], a "Ponmocup Finder" tool and published (CIF) feeds of malware domains.

• "Ponmocup Hunter" SANS DFIR Summit 2013
• History of Ponmocup Malware / Botnet
• Introducing Ponmocup-Finder
• Hunting Ponmocup Botnet
• Ponmocup, lots changed, but not all 
• Not APT, but nasty malware (Ponmocup botnet)

This year I have given three presentations called "My name is Hunter, Ponmocup Hunter", and each talk was different in some ways. To get the most out of all you may want to view the slides in chronological order, or you can just skip to the latest and most complete one from BotConf (although previous ones had more details about certain things).

• SANS DFIR Summit, Austin Texas, July 2013 (PDF slides, alt. link)
• DeepSec conference, Vienna Austria, November 2013 (PDF slides, alt. link)
• BotConf conference, Nantes France, December 2013 (PDF slides, video maybe soon)

The BotConf talk was video recorded and hopefully soon I will be able to review the video and decide if I want to release it or not. (Tweet me if you would like to see it for sure)

I recieved some very nice feedback after every presentation, here one of my favorite one:

(Twitter link)

My public work is done (at least for a while, who knows), but the fight against this botnet has just begun. If you have first hand knowledge about this malware (most commonly known probably as Vundo) please ask to join the Ponmocup Botnet Working Group which has been formed for this reason.

Update 2013-12-29:

There have been some great blog posts about the delivery of Ponmocup called Zuponcic Kit:

• Zuponcic: "Is it a bird?... Is it a plane?... No, it's another Exploit Kit" (Part 1)
• Zuponcic: "Is it a bird?... Is it a plane?... No, it's another... wait, what!?" (Part 2)

by Malwageddon

• Not quite the average exploit kit: Zuponcic  < Must Read !

by Maarten van Dantzig, Yonathan Klijnsma & Barry Weymes (Fox-IT)

In February at SAS2013 Eugene Aseev from Kaspersky Labs presented "The Hidden Bot", which also highlights the fact, that this malware / botnet is not well known and researched (yet). Unfortunately, the PDF doesn't show all details from the presentation, so if you would like the full-featured PPT version, please contact Eugene or me.

This post is a work in progress mostly just to link to my presentations and I will update it for a while, when new details become available.

Update 2014-01-30:

The video recorded from my latest "Ponmocup Hunter" talk at BotConf has been made publically available. Thanks to Frederic (@udgover) for the hard work put into making the video.

Just a couple warnings before linking to the video:

1) I don't consider myself a great nor experienced speaker. I was still very nervous for every talk, but during the talk it got better.

2) I had a very hoarse voice during my BotConf presentation because I was talking too much and too loud the night before with many great speakers and attendees at the dinner event.

So hopefully you keep this in mind when watching the video and can see past it. I was giving the talk because I wanted to make more people aware of this botnet, and looking at the activity in my working group I think I succeeded with that.

So without further ado, I hope you like the video !

Also check out the other BotConf videos available.

I also like this picture from my talk at DeepSec :-)

Cheers,
@c_APT_ure

"Ponmocup Hunter" SANS DFIR Summit 2013

Update: the presentation slides have been online for a while [PDF Link].
I've given a newer version of this talk at DeepSec and BotConf. Slides will be linked when made public.

I'm thrilled to give a presentation "My name is Hunter, Ponmocup Hunter" in July at the SANS DFIR Summit 2013 in Austin, Texas. (Summit / Agenda).

Abstract:

In early 2011 we discovered some botnet malware infected systems in our network. Starting from one A/V event we discovered several host- and network-based indicators to identify and confirm several infections. A brief high-level overview of the security architecture will help you understand how the indicators could be found and searched for. With a one-strike remediation all infected systems were quarantined and cleaned. A few weeks later the sinkholing of several known C&C domains showed the botnet was very big (several million bots). Quickly I got obsessed with analyzing and hunting this malware, which could infect fully patched systems without using exploits (only social engineering) and protected by firewalls, IPS and multi-layered A/V. The malware got some visibility and media attention in June 2012 with titles such as "printer virus", "printer bomb" or "Trojan.Milicenso: A Paper Salesman’s Dream Come True". This was likely due to an unwanted side-effect or "mistake" by the bot-master and probably didn't happen to all infected hosts or networks.

You'll learn:

• how the malware was discovered, what indicators were derived
• how all infected hosts were identified and how remediation was done
• how this malware spreads and how to defend against it
• how to detect infected systems (host & network indicators)
• how to find infected web servers used to spread it
• what malware functionalities are known and currently still unknown

If you can attend the DFIR Summit and haven't registered yet, you can use the discount code "Swiss10" to get 10% off.

In the mean time, if you're not familiar with the Ponmocup Malware yet, you can read my previous posts:

• History of Ponmocup Malware / Botnet
• Introducing Ponmocup-Finder
• Hunting Ponmocup Botnet
• Ponmocup, lots changed, but not all 
• Not APT, but nasty malware (Ponmocup botnet)

There are some more "Threat Intelligence" feeds available, beside the ones that have previously been listed:

Lists of Malware Domains and IPs (pre- and post-infection) [CIF usable]

http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-botnet-domains.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-botnet-ips.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-malware-domains.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-malware-ips.txt

Now there's also a list for:
Malware redirection servers and .htaccess infected web servers [CIF]

Ponmocup-Finder output:
Currently infected websites (redirecting to Malware downloads)
History of all infected websites (first and last seen)

For more details you can follow me on Twitter (@c_APT_ure) or look for #Ponmocup tweets.

If you would like to get involved with analyzing or fighting this Malware / Botnet please get in touch with me.

Cheers,
@c_APT_ure

History of Ponmocup Malware / Botnet

This is a history of some events and publications about the Ponmocup malware or botnet.
(work in progress -- will get updated eventually)

There are many aliases from different A/V vendors as previously mentioned on my blog
(Ponmocup, Pirminay, Kryptik, Swisyn, Vundo, Monder, Virtumonde/Virtumondo etc.).
The most often used lately is "Trojan Milicenso" by Symantec, which has a good blog post and detection description about it..
And it's been around at least since 2009, not just 2010 as mentioned in several places.

Update 2012-08-13: there have been some more related posts published since my original post

2012-07-04: Symantec blog "Trojan.Milicenso: Infection through .htaccess Redirection"

2012-07-02: Symantec blog "Printer Madness: W32.Printlove Video"

2012-06-25: ComputerWorld article "Malware infection forces printers to print garbled data"
2012-06-25: ITWorld "Printer malware – Wingdings gone wild"

2012-06-23: The Hacker News "Trojan.Milicenso - Printer Trojan cause massive printing"

2012-06-22: ZDNet "Thousands of office printers hit by 'gibberish' malware"
2012-06-22: Bloomberg Tech Blog "When Hackers Fumble: ‘Printer Bomb’ Noisily Announces Attack"
2012-06-22: NET-Security "Trojan infection triggers massive printing jobs"

2012-06-21: ARStechnica "Printer bomb malware wastes reams of paper, sparks pandemonium"
2012-06-21: SANS ISC diary "Print Bomb? (Take 2)"
2012-06-21: Symantec blog "Trojan.Milicenso: A Paper Salesman’s Dream Come True"

2012-06-14: Symantec KB article "Malware is causing network printers to print random ASCII characters"

2012-06-13: Mcafee Threat Advisory "Vundo"

2012-06-08: SANS ISC diary "Print Bomb?" (see also comments)
2012-06-08: Symantec forum thread "Print server gone wild"

2012-06-07: McAfee community forum thread "Printer Virus?"

2012-06-03: c-APT-ure blog post "Introducing Ponmocup-Finder"

2012-05-16: Sophos detection "Troj/Ponmocup-F"

2012-04-27: c-APT-ure blog post "Hunting Ponmocup Botnet"

2012-04-13: Collection of my tweets on Storify "A/V failed for Ponmocup malware!?"

2012-04-08: IOC on ForensicArtifacts.com "Ponmocup IOC released"

2012-03-08: c-APT-ure blog post "Ponmocup, lots changed, but not all"

2012-02-20: Ponmocup analysis page created "Why so many diff A/V detections?"

2012-02-18: c-APT-ure blog post "Not APT, but nasty malware (Ponmocup botnet)"

2011-11-15: Mandiant forum thread started "IOC request for Ponmocup malware (botnet)"

2011-05-30: created web page "Collection of links related to the Ponmocup botnet"

2011-05-23: Abuse.ch blog "How Big is Big? Some Botnet Statistics"

2011-04-22: TrendMicro detection "TSPY_PIRMINAY.A"

2011-04-21: Malware Survival "Media Site Pimping Malware"

2011-04-20: Sophos detection "Mal/Ponmocup-A" (detailed analysis of 3 samples)

2010-12-06: SPAMfighter news: "New Trojan Blocks Access To Bittorrent Websites: Webroot"

2010-11-25: Softpedia news "The Pirate Bay and Mininova Blocked by Mysterious New Trojan"

2010-11-24: Webroot blog "Troublesome Trojan Trammels Torrent Sites"

2010-07-14: Symantec detection created "Trojan.Milicenso"

2010-06-04: Microsoft MPC Encyclopedia entry "TrojanDownloader:Win32/Ponmocup.A"

2010-03-19: Sophos detection "Troj/Mdrop-CLC"

2009-12-30: Microsoft MPC Detection initially created "TrojanDropper:Win32/Ponmocup.A"

2009-11-22: Microsoft MPC Detection initially created "TrojanDownloader:Win32/Ponmocup.A"

Please report any broken (or obviously wrong) links, thanks.

Feedback and questions are welcome!

@c_APT_ure

Introducing Ponmocup-Finder

Update 2013-06-01:
Please also read my newer blog posts about Ponmocup:

• "Ponmocup Hunter" SANS DFIR Summit 2013
• History of Ponmocup Malware / Botnet

Ponmocup-Finder has evolved in a little "workflow" :-)

1. add new infected domains to the list
2. daily cronjob to run Ponmocup-Finder
3. latest Ponmocup-Finder script
4. list of currently infected webservers
5. history of all previously infected webservers
6. notification lists for CH / LI and DE domains

If you can do notifications for any infected webservers, go ahead and feel free to let me know.

It would be great to see some search engines (like Google, MS Bing etc.) to add checks for these infections to their spiders (need to change user-agents just for one request per site), since infections happen only through search engine redirects.

Update 2012-10-18:
Finally I updated the ponmocup-finder script as promised. I also managed to download a new infector and analyze the malware in a VM. You can also just look at some screenshots of the analysis.
And lastly here are some network indicators of C2:

  intohave.com / 64.179.44.188  (DNS request only)
  88.216.164.117

For more malicious domains and IPs you can download my malware feeds (also using CIF) here:

http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-botnet-domains.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-botnet-ips.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-malware-domains.txt
http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/malware-feeds/ponmocup-malware-ips.txt


Update 2012-09-25:

The Ponmocup finder script needs some update / tweeking, since the redirection URL patterns changed massively again (samples). Instead of just checking for the two previously known URL patterns ("/url\?sa=|/cgi-bin/r.cgi\?p=") it should check if the infected website domain appears in the URI parameters of the redirection URL. I will update the script on this post as soon as I find time.

You may have recently read a lot of hype about Flame or SkyWiper "cyber weapon", the son (or big brother) of Stuxnet and Duqu, which was found on a few thousand systems in a limited number of countries for espionage. Interesting and somewhat impressive, but this post is not about any of this stuff.

The Ponmocup malware and botnet is something totally different. A year ago the botnet was several million bots big (at least 4 million IPs, maybe a multiple thereof number of bots) [1]. And it does not target or discriminate against any specific country, so chances are likely bigger that you may find one of these bots in your network than a Flame infection.
Please read my previous three posts about Ponmocup to get an idea of what it is and how it works.


[1] Not APT, but nasty malware (Ponmocup botnet)
[2] Ponmocup, lots changed, but not all
[3] Hunting Ponmocup Botnet

Just to clarify something first, this post is more about detecting hacked or infected web servers redirecting unsuspecting visitors to malware downloads than about detecting infected bots themself. For the latter see my request to researchers to find current C&C domains in [3].

I don't know of any service including all 32 from urlvoid.com that detects these infected web servers.

So I threw together this little shell script that takes a list of domains and checks each domain with a single request if it's infected and redirecting visitors to Ponmocup malware (see [2]).

This script is aimed at registrars, ISPs, web hosters, GovCERTs, malware researchers, botnet hunters, or generally anyone who wants to find (and hopefully report) infected web servers and who has access to a large number of domains.

$ cat ponmocup-finder.sh
#!/bin/bash
echo "date started: `date`"
cat $1 | \
while read domain; do
  echo -ne "checking domain: $domain --> ";
  wget -Sv --tries=1 --connect-timeout=5 \

    --user-agent="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13" \

    --referer="http://www.google.ch/search?q=ponmocup+check" \

    http://${domain}/ -O ${domain}.out > ${domain}_wget.log 2>&1
  redir=`egrep -m 1 "Location: " ${domain}_wget.log`
## match=`echo $redir | egrep "(/url\?sa=|/cgi-bin/r.cgi\?p=)" | wc -l`
  match=`echo $redir | cut -d"?" -f2- | egrep "$domain" | wc -l`
  if [ $match -gt 0 ]
  then
    echo -ne "seems to be INFECTED: "
    echo -ne `echo $redir | cut -d" " -f2 | cut -d"?" -f1`
    egrep -m 2 "Resolving " ${domain}_wget.log | tail -1 | sed -e 's/Resolving/ --> DNS:/g'
  else
    echo "seems to be CLEAN"
  fi
done
echo "date finished: `date`"

Now let's run this script with a list of 88 domains (known to have been previously infected)

$ ./ponmocup-finder.sh domains-1.txt | tee ponmocup-finder_domains-1.log
checking domain: aviationhumor.net --> seems to be INFECTED: http://philosophymercer.com/cgi-bin/r.cgi --> DNS: philosophymercer.com... 62.212.74.228
checking domain: bgs-architekten.com --> seems to be INFECTED: http://capitalinformer.com/cgi-bin/r.cgi --> DNS: capitalinformer.com... 82.98.86.165
...
checking domain: www.w-en-ve.nl --> seems to be INFECTED: http://reportedtechniques.org/cgi-bin/r.cgi --> DNS: reportedtechniques.org... 208.91.197.108

How long did it take to check these 88 domains?  About 160 seconds

$ egrep "date " ponmocup-finder_domains-1.log
date started: Sat Jun  2 18:33:08 CEST 2012
date finished: Sat Jun  2 18:35:48 CEST 2012

Let's separate the clean and infected domains and do some stats:

$ egrep CLEAN ponmocup-finder_domains-1.log > ponmocup-finder_domains-1_CLEAN.log
$ egrep INFECTED ponmocup-finder_domains-1.log > ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log

$ wc -l ponmocup-finder_domains-1_*.log
   36 ponmocup-finder_domains-1_CLEAN.log
   52 ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log
   88 total

Let's look at the malware domains and IPs: (these are not C&C domains of infected clients)

Important note: some of the older, inactive domains appear to have been grabbed by some domain parking services. Thus not all domains and IPs below are used for malware distribution. I need to separate the good from the bad and ugly (later).

$ cat ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log | cut -d":" -f5- | awk '{ print $2" "$1 }' | sort | uniq -c

      1 176.53.112.108 ceprez.recycling-computers-portland.com...

      1 178.211.33.202 49847.hotel-sarajevo.com...

      1 178.211.33.202 lerberg.belanyi.com...

      1 178.211.33.203 38831.learn2drive4free.com...

      1 178.211.33.203 45215.thomasyohannan.com...

      1 178.211.33.203 46722.azangelfish.com...

      1 178.211.33.205 vamped.wonderfulroofing.com...

      3 199.59.241.218 herocopter.com...
      3 199.59.241.218 indanetwall.net...
      1 199.59.241.218 infernomag.com...
      2 208.91.197.108 reportedtechniques.org...
      2 217.11.251.173 underbuild.net...
      6 62.212.74.224 lewisentitled.com...
      2 62.212.74.228 philosophymercer.com...
      1 69.43.161.177 trialworld.net...

      1 77.79.11.96 45531.3d-tablet.cc...

      1 77.79.11.96 45585.3d-tablet.cc...

      2 82.98.86.165 capitalinformer.com...
      1 8.5.1.34 jesusonlynet.org...

      1 91.207.4.51 41950.thepetserver.com...

      1 91.207.4.51 52984.pballgames.com...

      1 94.63.149.247 handsexual.com...
      1 failed: 35803.finishline-fitness.co.uk...
      1 failed: 43560.vicandbarbs.net...
      1 failed: apartliberal.com...
      4 failed: besidesdream.com...
      2 failed: costslaid.com...
      3 failed: dutytraditional.net...
      1 failed: earlyanswered.com...
      1 failed: interestingchapter.net...
      1 failed: thousandmilitary.com...
      1 failed: twiceseparate.com...
      1 failed: watchingsquare.com...

And here are just the IPs:

$ cat ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log | cut -d":" -f5- | awk '{ print $2 }' | sort | uniq -c
      1 176.53.112.108
      2 178.211.33.202
      3 178.211.33.203
      1 178.211.33.205
      7 199.59.241.218
      2 208.91.197.108
      2 217.11.251.173
      6 62.212.74.224
      2 62.212.74.228
      1 69.43.161.177
      2 77.79.11.96
      2 82.98.86.165
      1 8.5.1.34
      2 91.207.4.51
      1 94.63.149.247
     17 failed:

And here's a list of all malware domains and IPs discovered: (numeric only subdomains replaced with "*")

$ cat ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log | cut -d":" -f5- | awk '{ print $2"\n"$1 }' | sed -e 's/[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]/\*/g' | sed -e 's/\.\.\.//g' | sort | uniq | egrep -v failed
176.53.112.108
178.211.33.202
178.211.33.203
178.211.33.205
199.59.241.218
208.91.197.108
217.11.251.173
62.212.74.224
62.212.74.228
69.43.161.177
77.79.11.96
82.98.86.165
8.5.1.34
91.207.4.51
94.63.149.247
*.3d-tablet.cc

apartliberal.com
*.azangelfish.com
besidesdream.com
capitalinformer.com
ceprez.recycling-computers-portland.com
costslaid.com
dutytraditional.net
earlyanswered.com
*.finishline-fitness.co.uk
handsexual.com
herocopter.com
*.hotel-sarajevo.com
indanetwall.net
infernomag.com
interestingchapter.net
jesusonlynet.org
*.learn2drive4free.com
lerberg.belanyi.com
lewisentitled.com
*.pballgames.com
philosophymercer.com
reportedtechniques.org
*.thepetserver.com
*.thomasyohannan.com
thousandmilitary.com
trialworld.net
twiceseparate.com
underbuild.net
vamped.wonderfulroofing.com
*.vicandbarbs.net
watchingsquare.com

And here's the list of infected domains (servers with malicious .htaccess file)


$ cat ponmocup-finder_domains-1_INFECTED.log | awk '{ print $3 }' | sort | uniq
aviationhumor.net
bgs-architekten.com
cryptonaux.co.uk
europschool.net
flowerbouquetsforweddings.com
hellokittyfighters.de
insurancepersonalpropertyassessments.com
pippatoledoshop.com
rabita-ms.ch
schoenstefaschingskostueme.com
www.apollonreisen.com
www.armsnetafrica.org
www.artistas-americanos.com
www.autocamp-nordsee.com
www.aylar.no
www.babfinance.net
www.canadawideflowers.ca
www.chinchillazucht.eu
www.demton.hu
www.dynam-med.info
www.europschool.net
www.extremebusa.com
www.feliceapicella.it
www.ferienwohnung-hotels-kroatien.de
www.flowerbouquetsforweddings.com
www.football-session.com
www.forexonlinegeheimnisse.com
www.guatemala-tourisme.info
www.hexenkostueme.com
www.hillsidebeachclub.com
www.hotelanderoper.com
www.hypequest.com
www.jenniferhejna.com
www.krcgent.be
www.lotex24.net
www.lotusnaturalspa.ch
www.moebel-direkt.net
www.oceanview-house.com
www.pr-klartext.de
www.ps3-fifaliga.de
www.radiofreecuba.com
www.smelugano2.ch
www.stadtbredimus.lu
www.stublla.net
www.sudani.co.za
www.swisshelp.info
www.thehighheelstore.com
www.theleesonhotel.com
www.titan.vc
www.vdomil.com
www.voegelitherapie.com
www.w-en-ve.nl

I'd be curious to know what percentage (or ppm) of any list of domains would be infected. Anyone wants to take a guess?

Hunting Ponmocup Botnet

Updated 2012-05-31: find new malware domains and IPs at the end of this post



Welcome to my third post about the ponmocup malware / botnet.

I have some more malware intel to share and also some request to other researchers as well.
Following is a list of Ponmocup redirection domains along with the domain of the hacked/infected website and date when it was discovered.

#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
# malware-domain malware-ip infected-website [date] (/cgi-bin/r.cgi)
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
apartliberal.com - www.canadawideflowers.ca [22/Mar/2012]
apartliberal.com - www.despec.com [23/Jan/2012]
argumenthistorical.org - www.steingym.schulnetz.hamm.de [08/Feb/2012]
argumenthistorical.org - www.steingym.schulnetz.hamm.de [18/Apr/2012]
argumenthistorical.org - www.stv-neuenhof.ch [17/Jan/2012]
besidesdream.com - flowerbouquetsforweddings.com [27/Feb/2012]
besidesdream.com - www.armsnetafrica.org [25/Jan/2012]
besidesdream.com - www.flowerbouquetsforweddings.com [27/Feb/2012]
besidesdream.com - www.hillsidebeachclub.com [29/Mar/2012]
capitalinformer.com - www.hotelanderoper.com [31/Jan/2012]
capitalinformer.com 82.98.86.165 bgs-architekten.com [17/Apr/2012]
checkforsec.com 8.5.1.45 www.artistas-americanos.com [12/Apr/2012]
costslaid.com - halongtours.com [25/Jan/2012]
costslaid.com - halongtours.com [26/Jan/2012]
costslaid.com - www.dynam-med.info [05/Jan/2012]
costslaid.com - www.jenniferhejna.com [09/Feb/2012]
costslaid.com - www.krcgent.be [27/Mar/2012]
dutytraditional.net - riccardoscamarcio.org [07/Feb/2012]
dutytraditional.net - vivadasrestaurant.ch [11/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.moebel-direkt.net [16/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.moebel-direkt.net [17/Feb/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.pr-klartext.de [27/Feb/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.redtoo.com [20/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.swisshelp.info [27/Mar/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.vivadasrestaurant.com [02/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.vivadasrestaurant.com [03/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.vivadasrestaurant.com [09/Jan/2012]
dutytraditional.net - www.vivadasrestaurant.com [11/Jan/2012]
earlyanswered.com - www.vdomil.com [30/Jan/2012]
everybodynames.org 94.63.149.247 www.kreutz-solutions.ch [16/Jan/2012]
formedtouch.com - www.voegelitherapie.com [12/Mar/2012]
gamecomes.org 94.63.149.247 www.ryandarts.de [08/Mar/2012]
handsexual.com 94.63.149.247 www.perfler.ch [10/Feb/2012]
handsexual.com 94.63.149.247 www.theleesonhotel.com [16/Jan/2012]
herocopter.com - www.aylar.no [09/Jan/2012]
herocopter.com - www.titan.vc [12/Jan/2012]
herocopter.com 199.59.241.228 www.stublla.net [23/Apr/2012]
herocopter.com 199.59.241.232 www.guatemala-tourisme.info [27/Mar/2012]
iamprotectedfrom.net - www.newtonvineyard.com [20/Apr/2012]
indanetwall.net - schoenstefaschingskostueme.com [27/Feb/2012]
indanetwall.net 199.59.241.228 www.forexonlinegeheimnisse.com [24/Apr/2012]
indanetwall.net 199.59.241.228 www.hexenkostueme.com [18/Apr/2012]
indanetwall.net 94.63.149.246 www.hexenkostueme.com [12/Jan/2012]
infernomag.com - cryptonaux.co.uk [06/Jan/2012]
infernomag.com - www.samariter-zuerich-uu.ch [24/Jan/2012]
interestingchapter.net - www.hypequest.com [16/Jan/2012]
interestingchapter.net - www.hypequest.com [17/Jan/2012]
interestingchapter.net - www.hypequest.com [21/Mar/2012]
interestingchapter.net - www.hypequest.com [30/Jan/2012]
jesusonlynet.org 94.63.149.246 www.babfinance.net [13/Mar/2012]
jesusonlynet.org 94.63.149.246 www.babfinance.net [23/Apr/2012]
jesusonlynet.org 94.63.149.246 www.babfinance.net [29/Mar/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.extremebusa.com [20/Feb/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.feliceapicella.it [16/Jan/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.lotex24.net [02/Apr/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.lotex24.net [03/Apr/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.ps3-fifaliga.de [13/Jan/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.radiofreecuba.com [22/Mar/2012]
lewisentitled.com 62.212.74.224 www.thehighheelstore.com [21/Jan/2012]
metromanias.com - sixstringtheory.com [27/Jan/2012]
metromanias.com - www.boiron.ch [03/Jan/2012]
metromanias.com - www.boiron.ch [14/Jan/2012]
metromanias.com - www.midagiochi.com [26/Jan/2012]
metromanias.com - www.whuckaba.com [25/Jan/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 aviationhumor.net [20/Apr/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 dallasbbq.com [03/Jan/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.football-session.com [07/Feb/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.greenzer.fr [12/Jan/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.greenzer.fr [19/Apr/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.greenzer.fr [29/Feb/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.greenzer.fr [29/Mar/2012]
philosophymercer.com 62.212.74.228 www.greenzer.fr [31/Mar/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 mjmbooks.com [23/Feb/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 online-aste.com [13/Mar/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 online-aste.com [23/Mar/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.chinchillazucht.eu [02/Mar/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.kurtlarvadisi.com [09/Jan/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.kurtlarvadisi.com [25/Jan/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.mhw-bike-house.de [27/Mar/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.panafilmforum.com [01/Feb/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.schlosstaetscher.ch [06/Jan/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.schlosstaetscher.ch [24/Jan/2012]
reportedtechniques.org 94.63.149.246 www.w-en-ve.nl [19/Mar/2012]
severalcamp.com 94.63.149.246 www.stadtbredimus.lu [07/Feb/2012]
sslabssys.com 208.91.197.101 www.bestofpinball.de [17/Jan/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 gyro-bau.ch [12/Mar/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 gyro-bau.ch [23/Mar/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 www.brautwelt.com [15/Mar/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 www.brautwelt.com [24/Apr/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 www.brautwelt.com [25/Apr/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 www.demton.hu [08/Feb/2012]
teethalong.org 94.63.149.246 www.lotusnaturalspa.ch [04/Jan/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - lemobilierdesign.com [01/Feb/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - lemobilierdesign.com [08/Feb/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - lemobilierdesign.com [09/Feb/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - lemobilierdesign.com [09/Mar/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - pippatoledoshop.com [18/Feb/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - www.lemobilierdesign.com [12/Mar/2012]
thousandmilitary.com - www.lemobilierdesign.com [20/Apr/2012]
trackallnet.com - awmusic.ca [03/Mar/2012]
trackallnet.com - kueppersbusch.getware.de [07/Mar/2012]
trackallnet.com 94.63.149.246 kueppersbusch.getware.de [13/Jan/2012]
trialworld.net 69.43.161.177 www.smelugano2.ch [27/Mar/2012]
twiceseparate.com - insurancepersonalpropertyassessments.com [18/Jan/2012]
underbuild.net 94.63.149.246 rabita-ms.ch [09/Feb/2012]
underbuild.net 94.63.149.246 www.sudani.co.za [23/Apr/2012]
underbuild.net 94.63.149.246 www.unterwasserkamera.at [09/Mar/2012]
underbuild.net 94.63.149.246 www.unterwasserkamera.at [26/Jan/2012]
underbuild.net 94.63.149.246 www.unterwasserkamera.at [28/Feb/2012]
virtualmapping.org - www.globusgateway.ch [16/Jan/2012]
watchingsquare.com - www.comboxansagen.com [26/Mar/2012]

#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
# malware-domain malware-ip infected-website [date] (/url)
#--------------------------------------------------------------------------
52586.pballgames.com 77.79.11.96 www.apollonreisen.com [24/Apr/2012]
53771.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96 www.flyksa.com [16/Apr/2012]
57298.learn2drive4free.com 178.211.33.203 www.autocamp-nordsee.com [19/Apr/2012]
59368.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96 www.europschool.net [12/Apr/2012]
61503.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96 europschool.net [26/Apr/2012]
62342.thepetserver.com 77.79.11.96 www.oceanview-house.com [24/Apr/2012]
ceprez.recycling-computers-portland.com 176.53.112.108 hellokittyfighters.de [19/Apr/2012]
fckery.getbetweenthecovers.com 178.211.33.203 www.ferienwohnung-hotels-kroatien.de [12/Apr/2012]

Of the 88 domains above, 60 servers still appear to be infected at this time.

• list of 88 domains
• list of 60 infected servers
• log of wget 1 & 2

Now part of me says "why haven't you already informed all website owners or hosters about the hacked servers?". But the other part thinks, why not use the hacked servers to get some more current trojan-downloader samples and infect some (VM) clients to study the C&C traffic and create new network indicators (since the "old" ET Snort rules seem ineffective now).

Well, and that's the challenge or request to other malware researchers, since I haven't been able to successfully download any samples recently.

I've shown in the wget logs how you can (try to) download an infector sample. Try it from a "home IP" and/or a "corporate IP-range" (should be safe with wget), you might get different results.

Actually, after taking a closer look at the files downloaded by wget, it looks like the malware download would only work with a browser. Take a look at the scripts at the end of one file.

So you probably won't get the malware using wget anymore.

When infecting a client, try using a corporate IP-, DNS-, Domain-config, since I believe "ipconfig" is called by the trojan-downloader and the further behaviour could depend on the ipconfig output.

If you're interested in researching this malware / botnet and are able to do any of the above mentioned I'd be very interested to hear from you.

Thanks for any help or feedback!

@c_APT_ure

Updated 2012-04-30:

I've collected some of my tweets about the Ponmocup malware here on Storify:
http://storify.com/c_APT_ure/a-v-failed-for-ponmocup-malware

So I found a new source of malware today, virusshare.com, thanks to Ken!
Searching for "ponmocup" I got 160 results, but I could download only 20.

Updated 2012-05-13:

I received the results for all 160 Ponmocup samples. See additional stats at the end.

Here is an analysis of the A/V detections of these 20 samples:

20 Panda
20 NOD32
20 Ikarus
20 GData
20 F-Secure
20 Emsisoft
20 DrWeb
20 BitDefender
20 Avast
19 Norman
19 Kaspersky
19 Fortinet
19 Comodo
19 AntiVir
19 AhnLab-V3
19 AVG
18 TrendMicro-HouseCall
18 TrendMicro
18 Microsoft
18 K7AntiVirus
17 nProtect
17 VIPRE
17 McAfee-GW-Edition
17 McAfee
17 Jiangmin
15 VirusBuster
15 Symantec
15 Sophos
14 VBA32
14 TheHacker
14 PCTools
11 F-Prot
11 Commtouch
10 SUPERAntiSpyware
9 Rising
9 ClamAV
9 Antiy-AVL
8 eTrust-Vet
8 ViRobot
6 ByteHero
5 eSafe
3 CAT-QuickHeal

And the detections are:

1 AVG = Downloader.Generic10.BMDC
1 AVG = Downloader.Generic10.BOLE
1 AVG = Downloader.Small.62.D
1 AVG = Dropper.Generic4.BXSO
8 AVG = Dropper.VB.CMD
1 AVG = Generic22.JDH
1 AVG = Generic25.AFPK
1 AVG = Generic25.AIJK
1 AVG = Generic25.BRLU
1 AVG = Generic25.BTFX
1 AVG = Generic25.BTHJ
1 AVG = Suspicion: unknown virus
1 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.HDC
2 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.Jorik
1 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.Monder
5 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.Pirminay
8 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.Swisyn
1 AhnLab-V3 = Win-Trojan/Pirminay.313344.M
1 AhnLab-V3 = Win-Trojan/Pirminay.438601
1 AntiVir = TR/Crypt.XPACK.Gen
1 AntiVir = TR/Dldr.Ponmocup.A.393
1 AntiVir = TR/Downloader.Gen
1 AntiVir = TR/Graftor.1139.2
1 AntiVir = TR/Graftor.3421.1
1 AntiVir = TR/Graftor.3421.2
1 AntiVir = TR/Monder.mzyl
1 AntiVir = TR/Pirminay.bg.2
1 AntiVir = TR/Pirminay.bhf
1 AntiVir = TR/Pirminay.bhy
1 AntiVir = TR/Spy.438876.1
8 AntiVir = TR/VB.Downloader.Gen
2 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Jorik
1 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Jorik.gen
1 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Monder
1 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Pirminay
3 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Pirminay.gen
1 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/win32.agent
8 Avast = Win32:Hosts-J [Trj]
1 Avast = Win32:Kryptik-WL [Trj]
1 Avast = Win32:MalOb-EI [Cryp]
7 Avast = Win32:Malware-gen
1 Avast = Win32:Pirminay-DW [Trj]
1 Avast = Win32:Spyware-gen [Spy]
1 Avast = Win32:Trojan-gen
1 BitDefender = Backdoor.Generic.542938
1 BitDefender = Gen:Variant.Graftor.1139
1 BitDefender = Gen:Variant.Graftor.3421
1 BitDefender = Gen:Variant.Vundo.11
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.5274711
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.6148391
2 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.6270838
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.6764589
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.6871065
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.6892427
1 BitDefender = Trojan.Generic.KD.393940
8 BitDefender = Trojan.QHosts.AVD
5 ByteHero = Trojan.Win32.Heur.Gen
1 ByteHero = Virus.Win32.Heur.p
1 CAT-QuickHeal = Trojan.Jorik.Pirminay.aoq
1 CAT-QuickHeal = Trojan.Monder.mzyl
1 CAT-QuickHeal = TrojanDownloader.Ponmocup.a
1 ClamAV = Trojan.Agent-183385
8 ClamAV = Trojan.VB-43290
2 Commtouch = W32/FakeAlert.FT.gen!Eldorado
1 Commtouch = W32/FakeAlert.LP.gen!Eldorado
8 Commtouch = W32/Swisyn.E.gen!Eldorado
8 Comodo = TrojWare.Win32.Swisyn.C
5 Comodo = TrojWare.Win32.Trojan.Agent.Gen
6 Comodo = UnclassifiedMalware
1 DrWeb = Trojan.DownLoader5.4289
1 DrWeb = Trojan.DownLoader5.5892
1 DrWeb = Trojan.Fakealert.26434
1 DrWeb = Trojan.Hosts.2582
9 DrWeb = Trojan.Hosts.303
1 DrWeb = Trojan.MulDrop1.59103
4 DrWeb = Trojan.WinSpy.1014
2 DrWeb = Trojan.WinSpy.origin
1 Emsisoft = Riskware.AdWare.Win32.SuperJuan!IK
6 Emsisoft = Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Ponmocup!IK
1 Emsisoft = Trojan.Pirminay!IK
4 Emsisoft = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay!IK
8 Emsisoft = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn!IK
2 F-Prot = W32/FakeAlert.FT.gen!Eldorado
1 F-Prot = W32/FakeAlert.LP.gen!Eldorado
8 F-Prot = W32/Swisyn.E.gen!Eldorado
1 F-Secure = Backdoor.Generic.542938
1 F-Secure = Gen:Variant.Graftor.1139
1 F-Secure = Gen:Variant.Graftor.3421
1 F-Secure = Gen:Variant.Vundo.11
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.5274711
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.6148391
2 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.6270838
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.6764589
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.6871065
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.6892427
1 F-Secure = Trojan.Generic.KD.393940
8 F-Secure = Trojan.QHosts.AVD
1 Fortinet = PossibleThreat
1 Fortinet = W32/Evx.BG!tr
1 Fortinet = W32/Jorik_Pirminay.ANO!tr
1 Fortinet = W32/Kryptik.ANL!tr
1 Fortinet = W32/Malware_fam.NB
1 Fortinet = W32/Monder.MZYL!tr
2 Fortinet = W32/Pirminay.A!tr
1 Fortinet = W32/Ponmocup.A
1 Fortinet = W32/Ponmocup.AA
8 Fortinet = W32/Swisyn.CQV!tr
1 Fortinet = W32/Virtum!tr
1 GData = Backdoor.Generic.542938
1 GData = Gen:Variant.Graftor.1139
1 GData = Gen:Variant.Graftor.3421
1 GData = Gen:Variant.Vundo.11
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.5274711
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.6148391
2 GData = Trojan.Generic.6270838
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.6764589
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.6871065
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.6892427
1 GData = Trojan.Generic.KD.393940
8 GData = Trojan.QHosts.AVD
6 Ikarus = Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Ponmocup
1 Ikarus = Trojan.Pirminay
4 Ikarus = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay
8 Ikarus = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn
1 Ikarus = not-a-virus:AdWare.Win32.SuperJuan
2 Jiangmin = Trojan/Generic.kfzm
1 Jiangmin = Trojan/Generic.kkfx
2 Jiangmin = Trojan/Generic.knvv
1 Jiangmin = Trojan/Pirminay.gr
1 Jiangmin = Trojan/Pirminay.gs
1 Jiangmin = Trojan/Pirminay.up
8 Jiangmin = Trojan/Swisyn.cby
1 Jiangmin = TrojanDownloader.Agent.ctuc
6 K7AntiVirus = Riskware
12 K7AntiVirus = Trojan
2 Kaspersky = HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Jorik.Pirminay.ano
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Jorik.Pirminay.aoq
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Jorik.Pirminay.avy
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Monder.mzyl
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay.bg
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay.bhy
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay.cub
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay.hjy
1 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay.hlu
8 Kaspersky = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.jyb
1 McAfee = Downloader.a!bu
1 McAfee = Downloader.a!cc
1 McAfee = Downloader.a!vz
1 McAfee = Generic Downloader.x!g2z
1 McAfee = Generic.dx!yak
1 McAfee = Generic.evx!bd
2 McAfee = Generic.evx!bg
1 McAfee = Kryp.b
8 McAfee = Swisyn.s
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Downloader.a!cc
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Generic Downloader.x!g2z
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Generic.dx!yak
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Generic.evx!bd
2 McAfee-GW-Edition = Generic.evx!bg
4 McAfee-GW-Edition = Heuristic.BehavesLike.Win32.Downloader.A
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Heuristic.BehavesLike.Win32.Downloader.D
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Heuristic.BehavesLike.Win32.Downloader.H
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Heuristic.LooksLike.Trojan.Dropper.B
1 McAfee-GW-Edition = Kryp.b
3 McAfee-GW-Edition = Swisyn.s
1 Microsoft = Trojan:Win32/Meredrop
16 Microsoft = TrojanDownloader:Win32/Ponmocup.A
1 Microsoft = TrojanDownloader:Win32/Renos.KC
2 NOD32 = Win32/Ponmocup.AA
8 NOD32 = Win32/Qhost.NRX
2 NOD32 = Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.PXO
1 NOD32 = a variant of Win32/Kryptik.LLT
1 NOD32 = a variant of Win32/Kryptik.SWI
1 NOD32 = a variant of Win32/Kryptik.UFA
1 NOD32 = a variant of Win32/Kryptik.VDN
3 NOD32 = a variant of Win32/Ponmocup.AA
1 NOD32 = probably a variant of Win32/Agent.BTILRDN
8 Norman = W32/DLoader.ACMAD
3 Norman = W32/Kryptik.AIF
8 Norman = W32/Obfuscated.L
8 PCTools = Malware.Changeup
5 PCTools = Trojan.Gen
1 PCTools = Trojan.Milicenso
3 Panda = Generic Trojan
2 Panda = Suspicious file
1 Panda = Trj/Agent.OLO
6 Panda = Trj/CI.A
8 Panda = Trj/Qhost.LU
1 Rising = Trojan.Win32.Generic.129CDFF1
8 Rising = Trojan.Win32.QHost.awf
1 SUPERAntiSpyware = Trojan.Agent/Gen-Falcomp[RE]
2 SUPERAntiSpyware = Trojan.Agent/Gen-Falprod[RE]
5 SUPERAntiSpyware = Trojan.Agent/Gen-HackHost
2 SUPERAntiSpyware = Trojan.Agent/Gen-Qhost
2 Sophos = Mal/Generic-L
1 Sophos = Mal/Ponmocup-A
8 Sophos = Mal/Swisyn-D
1 Sophos = Sus/Behav-278
1 Sophos = Troj/Ponmo-A
2 Sophos = Troj/Virtum-Gen
1 Symantec = Suspicious.Cloud
5 Symantec = Trojan.Gen
1 Symantec = Trojan.Milicenso
7 Symantec = W32.Changeup!gen
1 Symantec = WS.Reputation.1
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Downloader.Agent.pxo
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Kryptik.vdn
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Pirminay.bhf
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Pirminay.bhy
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Pirminay.fwy
1 TheHacker = Trojan/Ponmocup.aa
8 TheHacker = Trojan/Swisyn.jyb
8 TrendMicro = TROJ_FAM_00001e3.TOMA
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R11C7KB
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R21C2F4
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R21C2FE
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R23C3BD
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R3BCRBR
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R47C7K8
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R47C7KE
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_GEN.R4AC7KK
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_PONMOCUP.AB
1 TrendMicro = TROJ_PONMOCUP.AC
8 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_FAM_00001e3.TOMA
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R11C7KB
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R21C2F4
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R21C2FE
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R23C3BD
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R3BCRBR
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R47C7K8
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R47C7KE
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_GEN.R4AC7KK
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_PONMOCUP.AB
1 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_PONMOCUP.AC
1 VBA32 = SScope.Trojan.Pirminay.chc
8 VBA32 = SScope.Trojan.VB.0609
1 VBA32 = Trojan.Fksys.81105
1 VBA32 = Trojan.Jorik.Pirminay.ano
1 VBA32 = Trojan.Pirminay.bg
1 VBA32 = Trojan.Pirminay.cta
1 VBA32 = Trojan.Pirminay.fwz
1 VIPRE = Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.ecjo (v)
7 VIPRE = Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT
1 VIPRE = Trojan.Win32.Monder.gen
8 VIPRE = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.jyb (v)
8 ViRobot = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.65024
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Kryptik!XPYaFkgQJuY
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Kryptik!YhtS8OcgDPE
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Monder!KTXAshYxjGA
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Pirminay!1T9hymiWPH0
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Ponmocup!Qf/SCxIUIDk
1 VirusBuster = Trojan.Ponmocup!lGJTkqsZNdg
8 VirusBuster = Trojan.Swisyn!whPY1JLc4mw
1 VirusBuster = TrojanSpy.Agent!jdleA1Gsspg
1 eSafe = Win32.GenVariant.Gra
1 eSafe = Win32.HEURCrypted.E
1 eSafe = Win32.Milicenso
1 eSafe = Win32.TRGraftor
1 eSafe = Win32.Trojan
8 eTrust-Vet = Win32/Swisyn.R
1 nProtect = Backdoor/W32.Agent.294341
3 nProtect = Gen:Variant.Graftor.3421
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Jorik.219136.B
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Jorik.236032.B
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Jorik.243712.D
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Pirminay.17176
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Pirminay.313344
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Pirminay.438601
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.QHosts.122880
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.QHosts.147456
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Swisyn.126976.G
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Swisyn.157184
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Swisyn.184320.I
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Swisyn.241664.F
1 nProtect = Trojan/W32.Swisyn.79872

There is only one A/V product that recognized more than half the samples with the same detection name:

16 Microsoft = TrojanDownloader:Win32/Ponmocup.A

The samples MD5 are:

MD5 c23425f852e3ad188effc205317142fc
MD5 bb479a7e69c5e1c503aa6dd506c732f3
MD5 9e08f52039eeacf7f3e8696046358684
MD5 97a1acc085849c0b9af19adcf44607a7
MD5 f8fd20b40667882e9e7301fb76b890c0
MD5 4734169e48df4fea56bce65ec0e56066
MD5 fcac6af96d814f68c9a48d9cc5ad91ed
MD5 f7efabd89d9b4d4ee3f3b4875c11b47c
MD5 ffe728d69c233b6f09b016084be62270
MD5 edf380c2b7526cf521818af7d1ea6727
MD5 e918c9bd0093b52590c3c93751a84b56
MD5 e5dfa7c6ef3b2853a98f02178ffbfed8
MD5 cc699a17b1f9fc43d419f2d8cbf1e24b
MD5 b8a3097df22fe768639738fbf1afca98
MD5 b6babab0cbcc42a07d89df325ddeccdf
MD5 a939841b8e4724d1b0163b30f0d9baec
MD5 651589d6999c4017c8f42a9cabdb5a85
MD5 5e501ecbadd0a9d0f380f918f1c4986e
MD5 5b9ece2e5d16bdcb86e3ad8b3259991a
MD5 58d7c19e16e421440e372780832ecf61

And here are some more file details.

Updated 2012-05-13:

I received the results for all 160 Ponmocup samples. See additional stats at the end.

Here the number of detections of 160 samples for each A/V:

    158 GData
    158 BitDefender
    157 Ikarus
    155 AntiVir
    154 NOD32
    153 F-Secure
    151 AVG
    149 Avast
    148 VIPRE
    146 Panda
    145 Microsoft
    145 McAfee-GW-Edition
    141 McAfee
    141 Comodo
    140 AhnLab-V3
    138 Sophos
    138 Norman
    137 nProtect
    136 Kaspersky
    134 TrendMicro-HouseCall
    133 TrendMicro
    133 Emsisoft
    132 K7AntiVirus
    130 Symantec
    127 Jiangmin
    124 PCTools
    123 TheHacker
    123 Fortinet
    114 VirusBuster
    101 Avast5
    100 DrWeb
     99 Antiy-AVL
     88 VBA32
     78 CAT-QuickHeal
     65 SUPERAntiSpyware
     55 F-Prot
     55 Commtouch
     52 Rising
     46 eSafe
     34 eTrust-Vet
     34 ViRobot
     27 ClamAV
     12 ByteHero
      3 Prevx

Here the top 25 of detections with the same name:

    136 Microsoft = TrojanDownloader:Win32/Ponmocup.A
    106 Ikarus = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay
     96 VIPRE = Trojan.Win32.Generic!BT
     86 Emsisoft = Trojan.Win32.Pirminay!IK
     76 Comodo = TrojWare.Win32.Trojan.Agent.Gen
     76 Antiy-AVL = Trojan/Win32.Pirminay.gen
     74 Norman = W32/Obfuscated.L
     70 Panda = Trj/CI.A
     67 K7AntiVirus = Riskware
     63 K7AntiVirus = Trojan
     57 PCTools = Trojan.Gen
     56 Sophos = Mal/Generic-L
     52 Symantec = Trojan.Gen
     34 Avast = Win32:Malware-gen
     34 AhnLab-V3 = Trojan/Win32.Pirminay
     32 Sophos = Mal/Ponmocup-A
     32 NOD32 = Win32/TrojanDownloader.Agent.PXO
     32 Comodo = UnclassifiedMalware
     31 NOD32 = Win32/Qhost.NRX
     31 DrWeb = Trojan.Hosts.303
     30 eTrust-Vet = Win32/Swisyn.R
     30 VirusBuster = Trojan.Swisyn!whPY1JLc4mw
     30 ViRobot = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.65024
     30 VIPRE = Trojan.Win32.Swisyn.jyb (v)
     30 TrendMicro-HouseCall = TROJ_FAM_00001e3.TOMA

Some A/V use these common names (Ponmocup, Pirminay, Swisyn) but with numbering the variants. Here are the number of different variants per A/V:

     53 AhnLab-V3
     40 AntiVir
      3 Antiy-AVL
     10 Avast
      8 Avast5
     56 CAT-QuickHeal
      1 ClamAV
      2 Commtouch
      1 Comodo
      4 Emsisoft
      2 F-Prot
     33 Fortinet
      4 Ikarus
     57 Jiangmin
     95 Kaspersky
      1 McAfee
      1 McAfee-GW-Edition
      1 Microsoft
      2 NOD32
      1 Panda
      3 Sophos
     60 TheHacker
      2 TrendMicro
      2 TrendMicro-HouseCall
     45 VBA32
      2 VIPRE
      3 ViRobot
     21 VirusBuster
      1 eSafe
      3 eTrust-Vet
     58 nProtect

Highlighted are some A/V with the most detections under one well-known name, some variants of a well-known name, or some generic name.

You can make of this statistic whatever you like.

Updated 2012-05-30:

Here is a list of Ponmocup redirection domains & IPs from April and May 2012:

2012-04-02 *.americancollegefootballleague.com 178.211.33.203
2012-04-02 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-03 *.albinopleco.com 178.211.33.203
2012-04-03 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-04 *.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96
2012-04-05 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-05 *.nnan.co 178.211.33.203
2012-04-10 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-10 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-11 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-11 (fckery)*.getbetweenthecovers.com 178.211.33.203
2012-04-12 *.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96
2012-04-12 (fckery)*.getbetweenthecovers.com 178.211.33.203
2012-04-16 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-04-19 *.learn2drive4free.com 178.211.33.203
2012-04-19 (ceprez)*.recycling-computers-portland.com 176.53.112.108
2012-04-24 *.pballgames.com 77.79.11.96
2012-04-24 *.thepetserver.com 77.79.11.96
2012-04-26 *.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96
2012-04-27 *.albinopleco.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-01 *.crisisice.com 77.79.11.96
2012-05-02 (beawnca)*.buildyourbankaccount.com 178.211.33.202
2012-05-03 *.arizonabettas.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-03 *.arizonabettas.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-03 *.akitahusky.net 77.79.11.96
2012-05-10 *.arizonabettas.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-11 *.customshowerdoorandclosets.com 176.53.112.107
2012-05-11 (vrizasita)*.savegrady.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-15 (fliboyshit)*.zk28wines.com 178.211.33.205
2012-05-18 (belchar)*.psychicreadingstexas.com 178.211.33.205
2012-05-18 (fliboyshit)*.zk28wines.com 178.211.33.205
2012-05-19 *.peachtreepropainters.biz 77.79.11.96
2012-05-22 *.customshowerdoorandclosets.com 176.53.112.107
2012-05-23 (elianis)*.funfitnessconcepts.com 178.211.33.205
2012-05-24 *.learn2drive4free.com 178.211.33.203
2012-05-25 *.soroki.info 176.53.112.108
2012-05-25 *.3d-tablet.cc 77.79.11.96
2012-05-25 (derhana)*.ottawaapplianceservice.com 178.211.33.205
2012-05-29 (alqssas)*.kmpowersports.com 178.211.33.205

Since 2012-05-15 a new IP (178.211.33.205) has been used and several new domains.
The "*" subdomain is in place of the source-port number (4 - 5 digits), but recently I've seen some random alpha-char subdomains (e.g. "fliboyshit.zk28wines.com") which I've noted as "(random-alpha)*".

And here are some more infected servers: (malware-domain / infected-server-domain)

Using "/cgi-bin/r.cgi" redirection pattern:

herocopter.com  www.drdracingheads.com
earlyanswered.com  skyfield.eu
earlyanswered.com  www.thorenberg.ch
costslaid.com  www.comedy-hamburg.de
teethalong.org  www.brautwelt.com

Using "/url" redirection pattern:

turboldd.greensforum.com  www.tanz-tschui.ch
64890.customshowerdoorandclosets.com  www.novoglas.ch
elianis.funfitnessconcepts.com  shop.wiltec.info
62708.dancearkansas.com  www.westcoastsports.ca
40172.learn2drive4free.com  www.autocamp-nordsee.com
61136.3d-tablet.cc  www.europschool.net
54280.soroki.info  citv.nl
derhana.ottawaapplianceservice.com  www.zur-sonne.de
alqssas.kmpowersports.com  www.real-art.ch

The infection can still be verified with some online services like urlquery.net or Wepawet as this example shows: (for this type of infection urlvoid.com is ineffective!)

http://www.urlvoid.com/scan/zur-sonne.de/
Detections     0/32 (0.00%)
Status     CLEAN  -- is wrong!

http://urlquery.net/report.php?id=61463
http://urlquery.net/domainmap.php?id=61463

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.zur-sonne.de
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.google.ch/search?q=search

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 19:58:03 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: wXu=88; path=/; domain=www.zur-sonne.de; expires=Thu, 07-Jun-2012 06:43:03 GMT
Location: http://derhana.ottawaapplianceservice.com/url?sa=D&source=web&cd=40&ved=0Y0njnzC0&url=http://www.zur-sonne.de/&ei=2ZIhfanJ4a20qo2MzFI19pu1pw==&usg=VtQuEf-ZH8RtWK5VeBWaYx&sig2=TcdEGbs2CczezFymxobGQs
Content-Length: 409
Keep-Alive: timeout=2, max=200
Connection: Keep-Alive

http://www.urlvoid.com/scan/brautwelt.com/
Detections     0/32 (0.00%)
Status     CLEAN  -- is wrong!

http://urlquery.net/report.php?id=61035
http://urlquery.net/domainmap.php?id=61035

http://wepawet.cs.ucsb.edu/view.php?hash=7bd389d100b214c2c3d828a625a4d960&t=1338367510&type=js

So much for now, will update later :)


Updated 2012-05-31: new IP in new AS from Ukraine

Since yesterday there seems to be a new domain and IP used for redirection.

*.suncoastintegration.com / 91.207.4.51

http://urlquery.net/report.php?id=61824
http://urlquery.net/domainmap.php?id=61824

GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.haar-kosmetik-elke.at
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101203 Firefox/3.6.13
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.google.ch/search?q=haare elke

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 15:22:26 GMT
Server: Apache
Set-Cookie: ycg=7; path=/; domain=www.haar-kosmetik-elke.at; expires=Thu, 07-Jun-2012 22:09:26 GMT
Location: http://64818.suncoastintegration.com/url?sa=D&source=web&cd=35&ved=0Uwyx0bHq&url=http://www.haar-kosmetik-elke.at/&ei=2ZIve67N5qe9r42LzFUw9Ju1pA==&usg=qxAULtLuZCKhxlKx8jozeI&sig2=Xbx4cH8V3ygWhtyx7magT7
Content-Length: 488
Connection: close